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ABSTRACT
Programmable packet processors and P4 as a programming lan-
guage for such devices have gained significant interest, because
their flexibility enables rapid development of a diverse set of applica-
tions that work at line rate. However, this flexibility, combined with
the complexity of devices and networks, increases the chance of
introducing subtle bugs that are hard to discover manually. Worse,
this is a domain where bugs can have catastrophic consequences,
yet formal analysis tools for P4 programs / networks are missing.
We argue that formal analysis tools must be based on a formal
semantics of the target language, rather than on its informal speci-
fication. To this end, we provide an executable formal semantics
of the P4 language in the K framework. Based on this semantics,
K provides an interpreter and various analysis tools including a
symbolic model checker and a deductive program verifier for P4.
This paper overviews our formal K semantics of P4, as well as
several P4 language design issues that we found during our formal-
ization process. We also discuss some applications resulting from
the tools provided by K for P4 programmers and network adminis-
trators as well as language designers and compiler developers, such
as detection of unportable code, state space exploration of P4 pro-
grams and of networks, bug finding using symbolic execution, data
plane verification, program verification, and translation validation.
1 INTRODUCTION
As an increasingly important part of our life and society, computer
networks have grown significantly in size and complexity. Tradi-
tionally, to handle the network scale, the networking hardware has
been hard coded with well-established network protocols needed
to run and manage the network. However, doing so has the down-
side of not being able to cope with the speed of innovation that is
necessary to satisfy the diverse and growing set of user demands,
because the process of modifying networking equipment tends to
be slow and expensive. This has ignited a line of research whose
goal is to make networks more programmable.
One of the most recent developments in this line of research,
P4 [9], is a high level declarative programming language for pro-
gramming packet processors. P4 allows the developers to specify
how a packet processor should process its incoming packets. A P4
compiler then translates the P4 program into an instruction set
understandable by the target hardware. The examples of targets
include software switches, high performance ASICs, FPGAs, and
programmable NICs.
Since its introduction in 2014, P4 has attracted significant interest
because the flexibility that it provides enables rapid development
of a diverse set of applications that can potentially work at line
rate, such as In-Band Network Telemetry [48] and switch based
implementation of Paxos [19]. However, this flexibility, combined
with the complexity of networks and networking hardware, in-
creases the chance of introducing subtle bugs that are very hard to
discover manually, yet can have catastrophic effects, from service
disruptions to security vulnerabilities.
Even without P4, answering the simplest questions about the
correctness of a network (e.g., what kind of packets can reach node
B from node A) has become manually prohibitive when the scale
and complexity of networks is taken into account. Subsequently,
a large body of research has recently focused on automating the
process of network verification [33–35, 47]. However, most of these
works assume a simple fixed structure for the packet processors and,
as a result, may miss many details. P4 makes manual verification
even harder, if not impossible. Consequently, there is a big need
for automated tools to analyze P4 programs or networks of nodes
programmed using P4.
We adhere to [18] that analysis tools for any programming lan-
guagemust be based on the formal semantics of that language rather
than on its informal specification. Informal semantics are subject
to interpretation by different tool developers and usually there is
no guarantee that these interpretations are consistent with the
specification or with each other. As shown in [18], state-of-the-art
program analysis tools based on informal language specifications
“prove” incorrect properties or fail to prove correct properties of
programs due to their misinterpretation of the semantics of the
target programming language. Moreover, the informal language
specification itself might have problems, such as ambiguities, in-
consistencies, or even parts of the language not defined at all. This
is particularly relevant for new languages, like P4, whose design
has not matured yet.
It is therefore important to develop a formal semantics for P4.
Furthermore, to build confidence in the adequacy of a formal seman-
tics, we believe it should be: (1) executable, so it can be rigorously
tested against potentially hundreds of programs; (2) compact and
human readable, so it can be easily inspected and ultimately trusted
by everyone. Finally it must be (3) modular, so new language fea-
tures can be formalized without the need to change the previously
formalized features.
To this end, we have developed P4K, an executable formal seman-
tics of P4 based on the official P4 language specification [15]. P4K
faithfully formalizes all of the language features mentioned in the
P4 specification, with a few exceptions corresponding to features
whose meaning was ambiguous or incorrect or under specified and
we did not find any satisfactory way to correct it. We have reported
some of these issues to the P4 language designers [36–44] and are
working on a modified version of the specification [46] addressing
the issues. We validated P4K by executing 40 test cases provided by
one of the official compiler front-ends of P4 [16], a manually crafted
test suite of 30 tests, and by formally analyzing several programs.
We chose the K framework [56] for our P4 formalization effort.
It has several advantages that make it a suitable choice. First, a
language defined in K enjoys all three properties mentioned above.
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Second, once a programming language semantics is given, K au-
tomatically provides various tools for the language, including an
interpreter and a symbolic model checker, at no additional effort.
Finally, K has already been successfully used to formalize the se-
mantics of major programming languages such and C [23], Java [8],
JavaScript [53], etc.
The focus of this paper is the P4K formalization of P4, but we also
show how P4K and the tools provided by K can be used beyond just
a reference model for the language. We discuss several applications
useful for P4 programmers, language designers, and compiler devel-
opers, such as: detection of unportable code, state space exploration
of P4 programs and of networks, bug finding using symbolic execu-
tion, data plane verification, deductive verification, and translation
validation. Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• P4K: the most complete formal semantics of P4, based on the
official specification of P414 v. 1.0.4.
• A collection of P4 formal analysis tools for the networking
domain, automatically derived from the semantics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews P4 and
K, as well as the challenges in defining a semantics for P4. Sec-
tion 3 describes P4K, our K semantics of P4, and discusses some of
problems that we identified in the language specification. Section 4
evaluates our semantics. In Section 5 some of the applications of
the semantics are discussed. Section 6 reviews related work and
Section 7 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
Here we give background on P4 and K. We also discuss some of the
challenges that we faced in formalizing P4.
2.1 Software Defined Networks
Control plane is the part of the network responsible for making
packet forwarding decisions by running computations (e.g. routing
algorithms) based on the network state. Data plane is the collection
of forwarding devices (or packet processors) that actually carry
the network packets and execute the forwarding decisions. Tradi-
tionally, each device had its own vendor-provided control plane
hard-coded on the device. The need for rapid innovation has sparked
interest in Software Defined Networks (SDNs). SDN is a modern
architecture in which the control plane is physically separated from
the data plane. In this architecture, one controller can program a
set of forwarding devices through open, vendor-agnostic interfaces
such as OpenFlow [52].
In OpenFlow, each device processes the packets according to the
contents of one or more flow tables. Each table will contain a set of
flow entries. Abstractly, each entry is a (match, action) tuple. Match
provides values for specific fields in the packet header, and action
denotes the action to be performed if the packet header matches
the respective values in match. Possible actions include dropping,
modifying, or forwarding the packet. The controller programs the
data plane through installation and modification of flow entries.
OpenFlow assumes a fixed structure for the forwarding devices. It
explicitly specifies the set of protocol headers on which it operates,
the structure of the flow tables, the set of possible actions, etc.
Modification to any of these features requires an update to the
OpenFlow specification. Over the course of 4 years since the initial
header_type h_t { fields { f1 : 8; f2 : 8; } }
header h_t h1;
parser start { extract(h1); return ingress; }
action a(n) {
modify_field(h1.f2, n);
modify_field(standard_metadata.egress_spec , 1);}
action b() {
modify_field(standard_metadata.egress_spec , 2);}
table t {
reads { h1.f1 : exact;} actions { a; b; }}
control ingress { apply(t); }
Figure 1: A very simple P4 program
version of OpenFlow, the number of supported header fields in its
specification has been more than tripled [9].
2.2 P4
The limitations of OpenFlow and the need for expressiveness has
lead to the introduction of P4, a high level declarative programming
language for expressing the behavior of packet processors. In P4,
one can program a custom parser for their own protocol header,
define flow tables with customized structure, define the control flow
between the tables, and define custom actions. Hence, P4 allows
the developers to specify how a packet processor should process
its incoming packets (note, however, that P4 does not provide a
mechanism to populate the flow table entries; this is done by the
controller). A P4 compiler then translates the P4 program into the
instruction set of the hardware of the packet processor on which
the program is installed (the target).
We briefly describe the basic notions of the language here. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the language construct in more details. A P4 pro-
gram specifies at least the following components [15]. Header types:
Each specifies the format (the set and size of fields) of a custom
header within a packet. Instances: Each is an instance of a header
type. Parser: A state machine describing how the input packet is
parsed into header instances. Tables: Each specifies a set of fields
that the table entries can match on and a set of possible actions that
can be taken. Actions: Each (compound action) is composed of a set
of primitive actions which can modify packets and state. Control
flow: Describes the custom conditional chaining of tables within
the packet processor’s pipeline.
For example, in Figure 1, h_t is a header type consisting of two 8
bit fields f1 and f2. Header h1 is an instantiation of h_t. The parser
consists of a single state start which extracts h1 from the input
packet. There are two compound actions a and b in the program.
The actions use the modify_field primitive action. The entries in
table t match on field f1 in h1 and if applied, may call actions a
or b. An entry calling a must provide a value for n. The ingress
pipeline in this program only consists of applying table t.
P4 programs operate according to the abstract forwarding model
illustrated in Figure 2. For each packet, the parser produces a parsed
representation comprised of header instances and sends it to the
ingressmatch+action pipeline. Ingress, among other things, may set
the egress specification which determines the output port(s). Ingress
then submits the packet to the queuing mechanism the specification
of which is out of the scope of P4. The packet may also go through
the optional egress pipeline which may make further modifications
to the packet. Finally (if not dropped) the parsed representation will
be deparsed (i.e serialized) into the packet which will be sent out.
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Figure 2: P414 Abstract Forwarding Model [15]
P4 also supports re-circulation (looping packets inside the device)
and cloning of packets.
The P4 Language Consortium (http://p4.org) provides the official
specification of the language, as well as various other tools including
compiler front ends, software interpreters, runtime and testing
infrastructure, etc. There are two versions of P4 in current use,
P414 and P416. P416 has been released by the consortium in May
2017 [14] and it is much simpler and cleaner than P414, at the cost of
deliberately breaking backwards compatibility with P414. There are,
however, important P414 program which have not been translated
to P416, and, indeed, the P414-to-P416 translator provided by the
consortium is not semantics-preserving [27]. Ideally, we would
like to prove the translator correct, but for that we need formal
semantics of both P414 and P416. In this paper we only discuss our
formal semantics of P414, leaving that of P416 and the correctness
of the translator as future work. Throughout the paper, we refer to
P414 simply as P4.
2.3 Challenges in Formalizing P4
P4 has several characteristics that make it a challenging target for
formalization. Here we discuss some of this challenges and the way
we dealt with them.
Unstable language: P4 is a relatively young language and it takes
time for the community to reach consensus on its design. When
we started, the only publicly available version of P4 was P414 v.
1.1.0. That version soon was deprecated and replaced with v. 1.0.3
which we initially used to develop our semantics. In the middle of
our formalization effort, P416 v. 1.0.0 as well as a minor revision
of P414 (v. 1.0.4) were released. Thanks to K’s support for modular
definitions and reuse, we were able to rapidly adapt to changes and
finalize our semantics according to P414 v. 1.0.4. Through continu-
ous discussions with the P4 designers, we hope to help them reach
more stable versions sooner.
Imprecise specification: Since P4 is a newly developed language its
specification is not free of problems. There are many inconsistencies
and corner cases which are not discussed (Section 3). One of the
important contributions of this paper is the identification of these
problems through rigorous formalization.We have reported some of
the problems to the community. We are also working on a modified
version of the specification [46] addressing the issues we found.
No comprehensive test suite: Similar formalization efforts for other
languages (e.g. [23, 32, 53]) rely heavily on official test suites. Un-
fortunately, there is no official test suite for P4. To alleviate this
problem, in addition to testing our semantics against a test suite we
obtained from a P4 compiler, which only covers about half of our
semantic rules (Section 4), we hand-crafted a test suite that gives a
complete coverage of our semantic rules.
Unconventional input: The input to a P4 program is different from
that of conventional programming languages. P4 has two sources
of input. One is the stream of incoming packets that the device
running the P4 program needs to process. The other is the table
entries and configurations that are installed by the controller at
runtime. The mechanism by which the controller interacts with
the target at runtime is device-specific and is therefore out of the
scope of the language specification. Still, to be able to execute and
analyze P4 programs, for the target-specific language features we
tried to provide the most unrestricted executable semantics; for
example, if the order of some operations was unspecified then we
chose a non-deterministic semantics, so we can still explore the
entire state-space of behaviors using the K tools.
We also grouped most of the target specific semantic rules in a
separate semantic module. This way, the semantics is parametric
on the target specific details. One can provide a new target specific
module to change the target specific behavior, without the need to
touch the rest of the semantics. We have already used this feature
when we were testing our semantics against the p4c test suit as it
contained target specific features and assumptions (Section 4).
2.4 The K Framework
K [56] is a programming language semantics engineering frame-
work based on term rewriting. Its underlying philosophy is that
tools for a language can and should be automatically derived from
the formal semantics of that language. Indeed, K provides an ac-
tively growing set of language-independent tools, i.e., tools which
are not specific to any language but apply to any language which
has a K formal semantics. These include a parser, an interpreter, a
symbolic model checker, a sound and (relatively) complete deduc-
tive program verifier, and, more recently, a cross language program
equivalence checker and a semantic-based compiler. Some of the
tools are useful during the formalization process itself, the most
important of which is the interpreter. Using the interpreter, the
semantics can be tested against potentially many programs to gain
confidence in its correctness.
To define a programming language in K, one needs to define its
syntax and its semantics. Syntax is defined using BNF grammars an-
notated with semantic attributes. Semantics is given using rewrite
rules (also called semantic rules) over configurations. A configura-
tion is a set of potentially nested cells that hold the program and
its context. Each cell contains a piece of semantic information of
the input program such as the its state, environment, storage, etc.
Semantic rules are transitions between configurations: if parts of
the configuration match its left hand side, rewrite those parts as
specified by the right hand side. For example, this is a rule taken
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from P4K (modified for presentation) concerning reading the value
of field F from instance I:〈
I .F
V
···
〉
k ⟨⟨I ⟩ name ⟨true⟩ valid ⟨··· F 7→ V ···⟩ fieldVals ···⟩ instance
The contents inside each matching pair of angle braces constitutes
a cell, with the cell name as subscript. The k cell contains the
list of computations to be executed. The fragment of computation
at the front of the list (the left most) is executed first. There are
multiple instance cells each corresponding to a header instance.
name contains the name of the instance and valid keeps its validity
state. fieldVals is a map from each field name to the value stored
in the field in the given instance. The ellipsis are part of the syntax
of K and denote contents irrelevant to the rule. The horizontal line
denotes a rewrite. If the configuration matches the pattern, the
part of the configuration above the line will be replaced by the
content below the line. The rest of the configuration remain intact.
A rule may contain multiple rewrites at different positions of the
configuration. In that case, all rewrites will be applied in one step.
This example illustrates two properties of K that makes it suitable
for giving semantics specially to evolving programming languages
like P4. First, note that the actual configuration contains many
more cells and each cell may contain multiple elements, but the
rule only mentions the cells that are relevant. The configuration
abstraction feature of K automatically infers what the rest of cells
should be. Second, note that rewrites are local. There is no need
to rewrite the whole configuration. These two features make K
rules succinct and human readable. More importantly, they enable
modular development of the semantics: if the language specification
adds or modifies a language feature the rules irrelevant to that
feature do not need to be modified.
3 P4K
P4K is the most complete executable formal semantics of P414. It
is based on the latest official language specification (v. 1.0.4 [15])
and on discussions with the language designers. Our work is open
source and is available online [45]. The formalization process took
6 months to complete by a PhD student with some familiarity
with the K framework. Most of the time was spent learning K
and understanding the details of the P4 specification, including its
problems. P4K contains more than 100 cells in the configuration,
400 semantic rules, 200 syntax productions, and 2000 lines.
3.1 Syntax
The language specification provides a BNF grammar, whose conver-
sion to K was straightforward. We mostly copy-pasted the grammar
and made a few minor modifications to make it compatible with K.
During this process, in addition to minor problems, we identi-
fied [36] an ambiguity in the syntax between the minus sign in a
constant value (for specifying negative constant values) and the
unary negation operator. This ambiguity has important semantic
effects. In P4, all the field values have a bit width associated with
them. According to the specification “For positive [constant] values
the inferred width is the smallest number of bits required to con-
tain the value”. Also “For negative [constant] values the inferred
width is one more than the smallest number of bits required to
contain the positive value” [15]. So for example −5 interpreted as
a negative constant would yield a 4 bit value while if interpreted
as negation of a positive constant would yield a 3 bit result. Used
in an expression with other operators, this difference may affect
whether the expression overflows or not, which subsequently may
affect the final result.
3.2 Configuration
The configuration contains more than 100 cells. Figure 3 shows part
of it, featuring more important cells. All of the language constructs
including headers, instances, parser states, actions, tables, control
flows, etc have respective cells in the configuration containing their
static information and/or runtime state. For example the tables
cell will contain a set of table cells (“*” denotes multiple cells
with the same name). Each of the table cells contains a table’s
static information such as its name, the fields to match (reads), and
possible actions (acts). It also contains runtime information such
as the entries installed in the table.
Some cells contain the execution context. For example during
the execution of an action, the stackFrame cell holds a stack of
maps from each formal parameter of the executing action to the
respective argument values passed to the action.
The cells in and out contain the input and output packet stream
from/to all ports respectively. packetin contains the current packet
being processed and packout contains the packet being serialized.
Cells are populated or modified by processing the input P4 pro-
gram before execution, during the initialization, or during the exe-
cution as discussed next.
3.3 Semantics
After parsing, the P4 program populates the k cell and is executed
with the semantics rules.
3.3.1 Execution Phases. The rules describe the P4 program exe-
cution, in three phases.
Preprocessing: In this phase, P4K iterates over all the declara-
tions in the input P4 program (in the k cell), creating and populating
the corresponding cells and preparing the configuration for execu-
tion. In some cases auxiliary information is pre-computed for the
execution phase. An important such computation is the inference of
the order of packet headers for deparsing. Details will be discussed
in Section 3.3.2.
Initialization: There is an optional initialization phase after
preprocessing. It is used primarily to prepopulate the tables and
packet buffers before the execution in certain analysis such as sym-
bolic execution. The tables and packet buffers can also be populated
at runtime in normal execution.
Runtime: The actual execution of a P4 program happens during
this phase. It implements the abstract forwarding model. Packets
are taken from the input packet stream and processed using the
entries installed in the match+action tables by going through the
ingress and potentially the egress pipelines. The output packets are
appended to the output packet stream. This phase never terminates.
3.3.2 Language Constructs and Semantics. We briefly describe
the language constructs and primarily focus on interesting findings
and relevant semantics.
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〈⟨K⟩ k ⟨...⟩ headers ⟨...⟩ actions ⟨...⟩ controlFlows ⟨...⟩ parserStates ··· ⟨⟨⟨Id⟩ name ⟨SetFld⟩ reads ⟨SetAct⟩ acts ⟨ListEnt⟩ entries ⟩ table∗⟩ tables
⟨⟨⟨Id⟩ name ⟨Bool⟩ metadata ⟨Bool⟩ valid ⟨Id 7→ Val⟩ fieldVals ⟩ instance∗⟩ instances⟨⟨⟨Id⟩ name ⟨Id 7→ Val⟩ vals ⟩ stateful∗⟩ statefuls〈〈
ListMap
〉
stackFrame
〉
ctx
〈⟨ListId⟩ dporder ⟨⟨Int⟩ index ⟩ pctx〉 parser⟨Pkt⟩ packetin ⟨Pkt⟩ packetout ⟨⟨ListPkt⟩ in⟨ListPkt⟩ out⟩ buffer
〉
T
Figure 3: Part of the P4K configuration. The ellipsis symbols indicate omitted cells.
Header types: Each header type is a named declaration that
includes an ordered list of fields and their attributes (e.g. field width
and signedness). P4 also allows declaration of variable length head-
ers. During our formalization, we found corner cases (e.g. [40]) in
which the semantics of such headers are not completely clear.
Instances: Instancesmay be referenced in various runtime stages
including parsing, table matching, and action execution. Some in-
stances, called header instances (although the naming is not consis-
tent throughout the specification [41]), keep the parsed represen-
tation of the respective packet headers (i.e., the packet header is
extracted into the header instance). Other instances, called meta-
data, keep arbitrary per packet state throughout the pipeline. For
example h1 in Figure 1 is a header instance and meta in Figure 5 is
a metadata. In our semantics, both types of instances are kept as
instance cells, distinguished by their metadata cells (Figure 3).
It is also possible to declare fixed size, one dimensional array in-
stances (called header stacks), as sequences of adjacent headers (e.g.
to support MPLS [20]). We keep array elements as separate header
instances, with special names that include their index. Otherwise,
the elements are treated same as other instances.
Header instances are invalid (uninitialized) until validated in
parsing or by specific primitive actions in match+action processing.
According to the specification, reading an invalid header results in
an undefined value, whose behavior is target dependent. We model
this using a special value @undef. Use of @undef in an expression
or action call causes the execution to get stuck by default. We use
this feature to detect unportable code (Section 5.1).
Hash generators: The ability to calculate a hash value for a
stream of bytes has various uses in networking. P4 provides the
ability to declare hash generators (called field list calculations).
The developer provides a list of values (declared using a field list
struct) and selects a hash generation algorithm. The hash gener-
ator computes the hash of the bitstream generated from the list.
In the example below ipv4_checksum is a hash generator for the
ipv4_checksum_list field list (declaration omitted) with the IPv4
checksum algorithm (csum16).
field_list_calculation ipv4_checksum {
input {ipv4_checksum_list ;}
algorithm : csum16; output_width : 16; }
The language specification identifies a set of well known hash gen-
eration algorithms (e.g., IPv4 checksum and CRC). In our semantics,
we treat hash generation as a black box; K allows us to “hook” li-
brary function calls that implement the desired functionality. It is
possible to also directly specify the algorithms using K rules inside
the semantics, but we did not find any compelling reason to do so.
We found a problem [43] with the specification during the for-
malization of field lists. Each element of a field list can refer to a
field in an instance, an instance itself (when all the fields in that
instance are used), another field list (when all the fields identified
by that list are used), a constant value, or the keyword payload.
According to the specification “payload indicates that the contents
of the packet following the header of the previously mentioned field
is included in the field list” [15]. However, “previously mentioned
field” is ambiguous. For instance, below it is not clear if payload
refers to f1 or f2.
field_list fl1 { h.f1; }
field_list fl2 { h.f2; fl1; payload; }
Thus we do not provide semantics for payload. P416 has replaced
field lists with a C-like struct construct, disallowing the payload
keyword.
Checksums: A field in a header instance can be declared to be a
calculated field, indicating that it carries a checksum. The developer
provides a hash generator for verification of the checksum at the end
of parsing, and/or an update of the checksum during deparsing. For
example, below, the field hdrChecksum in the header instance ipv4
is declared to be a calculated field which uses the hash generator
ipv4_checksum for its verification and update.
calculated_field ipv4.hdrChecksum {
verify ipv4_checksum; update ipv4_checksum ;}
The P4 specification leaves undefined the order in which the calcu-
lated fields must be updated or verified. For verification, the order
canmatter depending on the target. For update, the order canmatter
in cases where the field list calculation of a calculated field includes
another calculated field. After discussing [44] with the language de-
signers, to obtain the most general behavior, we decided to choose
a non-deterministic order for update and verify. K provides a search
tool which one can use to explore all possible non-deterministic
outcomes to check whether they differ. (Section 5.2).
Parser: The user can define a parser to deserialize the input
packet into header instances (the parsed representation). The parser
is defined as a state machine. In each state, it is possible to extract
header instances (i.e., copy the data from the packet at the current
offset into respective field values for the given instances) and to
modify metadata. Then, it is possible to conditionally transition to
another state, to end the parsing, or to throw an (explicit) exception.
For example, in state parse_ethernet in Figure 4, after extracting
the ethernet header, based on the value of the etherType field,
the parser may transition to the parser state parse_ipv4 or end
the parsing and start the ingress pipeline.
Exception Handlers: P4 allows us to declare exception han-
dlers for implicit or explicit parser exceptions. In case an exception
occurs, parsing is terminated and the relevant handler is invoked.
Each handler can either modify metadata and continue to ingress or
immediately drop the packet. There is a default handler that drops
the packet. For example in Figure 1 if a packet is too short for the
extraction of h1, an implicit exception is thrown and the default
handler drops the packet.
Deparsing: This is the opposite of parsing. At egress, the (poten-
tially modified) valid header instances are serialized into a stream
of bytes to be sent. An important question in deparsing is the order
in which the header instances should be serialized. The parsing or-
der is not enough to find the deparse order, since header instances
might also be added (validated) or removed (invalidated) in the
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match+action pipeline. According to the specification “[A]ny for-
mat which should be generated on egress should be represented by
the parser used on ingress” [15] and the order of deparsing should
be inferred from the parse graph.
If the parse graph is acyclic, a topological order can be used as
the deparsing order. However, in general the graph might be cyclic
as there may be recursion in parsing. While in simple cases an order
can still be inferred (e.g., cases where recursion is only used for the
extraction of header stacks), there are cases in which a meaningful
order can not be inferred. This is a well known problem [11]. In
our semantics, we support simple cases of cyclic parse graphs. All
of the practical examples we have seen so far can be handled by
our semantics.
P416 has switched to an approach in which the deparse order is
explicitly defined by the programmer.
Stateful Elements: P4 supports stateful language constructs
that can hold state for longer than one packet, as opposed to per
packet state in instances. Counters count packets or bytes, meters
measure data rates, and registers are general purpose stateful ele-
ments. The declaration of each of these elements creates an array of
memory units. The units may be directly bound to the table entries.
In that case, the (counter and meter) units will automatically be
updated when the corresponding entry is matched in match+action.
The units may alternatively be static; then they should explicitly
be accessed or updated via special primitive actions. For example,
in Figure 5, reg is a static register with a single 8 bit memory cell.
In our definition we unified all these elements as instances of the
stateful cell (Figure 3) which can be accessed like registers. Other
operations are defined as functions which read and manipulate the
registers. Each stateful cell in the configuration has a map from
an index to a value. The index is either a table entry id (for direct)
or an array index (for static). The mechanism of updating meters is
target specific (not part of the language specification). Subsequently
we do not perform any action in case a meter is updated. If needed,
one can add a mechanism in our target specific module.
The specification does not specify [38] the initial value of the
stateful elements. It is sensible to assume that the initial value of
counters is 0, and similarly for meters. For registers, by default
we initialize the registers to @undef. Moreover, the specification
is inconsistent [39] about whether direct meters are allowed to be
explicitly updated by table actions. To be consistent with counters
and registers, we assume they are allowed.
Finally, if multiple counters/meters are directly bound to the
same table, the specification does not state [44] the order in which
the elementsmust be updatedwhen an entry in that table ismatched.
The order can affect the outcome in multi-threaded packet proces-
sors (Section 3.4) as there may be data races over stateful elements.
Again, we choose a non-deterministic order for updating the coun-
ters/meters, so we can systematically explore it using K’s search.
Actions: Compound actions are user defined imperative func-
tions that can take arguments and if called, perform a sequence of
calls to other compound actions or built-in primitive actions. Primi-
tive actions provide various functionality including arithmetic, ad-
dition/removal/modification of instances and header stacks, access/-
modification of stateful elements, cloning, re-circulation, dropping
the packet, etc. Actions are executed as a result of table matches.
We formalized all the primitive actions (see Section 3.5 for limita-
tions on clone primitive actions). The specification does not specify
the behavior of some corner cases, such as shift with negative shift
amount. We intentionally do not provide semantics for such cases
to detect unportable code.
The previous version of the specification [12] stated that all
primitive actions resulting from a table match execute in parallel,
making it unclear what the meaning of the following:
action a() {
modify_field(h.f, 1); modify_field(h.f, 2); }
modify_field(f,v) is a primitive action that updates field f with
v. The latest revision (1.0.4) switched to sequential semantics, so
we do not have to deal with this case anymore.
Tables: Tables will be populated at runtime by the controller.
Each entry provides values for the fields that are specified in the
declaration, an action that should be executed if the entry is selected,
and arguments to be passed to the action.
The interaction mechanism between the controller and P4 target
is out of the scope of the specification. Hence, the answer to ques-
tions such as what happens if a table is modified by the controller
while it is being applied on a packet is target dependent. We cur-
rently assume that modification and application of the same table
are mutually exclusive.
P4 provides various matching modes per each field. For exam-
ple, exact matches exact numbers and ternary matches ternary bit
vectors. It is also possible to associate priorities with table entries.
In case more than one table entry is applicable, the rule with the
highest priority will be selected. Longest Prefix Match (LPM) is a
special kind of ternary match useful for IP prefixes. The specifi-
cation specifies how the relative priority of an entry with LPM
match can be inferred bases on the corresponding match value of
the entry. However, it does not specify how the priority should be
decided in cases where there are more than one field with LPM
match type [37]. We assume all entries have explicit (unique) prior-
ities regardless of their match types. We keep the entries sorted in
their descending order of priority. To apply a table on a packet, we
iterate over the entries in order and select the first matching entry.
Control Flow: User defines the order and the conditions under
which various tables are applied to a packet using control func-
tions. The body of a control function is a control block consisting
of a sequence of control statements. A statement might apply a
table, call a control function, or conditionally select a control block.
Ingress is a special control function that is automatically called
after (successful) parsing. Egress is another (optional) special con-
trol function. If defined, it will automatically be called when the
queuing mechanism takes the packet to be sent out.
Other contstructs: We omit the discussion of value sets, action
profiles, and action selectors as well as many details of the discussed
constructs. Interested readers can refer to the semantics [45] for
more details.
3.4 Concurrency Model
Real world high performance packet processors have multiple
threads of execution. The specification is silent about the concur-
rency model. As a result, what constitutes a thread depends on the
target hardware. In our semantics, we support a multithreading
model in which each thread individually does all of what a single
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threaded program does by addition of a few more cells and rules1
(similar to Section 3.6). The input/out packet streams, the tables,
and the stateful elements constitute the shared memory between
the threads.
3.5 Limitations
P4 provides four primitive actions for cloning a packet under pro-
cess from ingress/egress to ingress/egress. The actions that clone a
packet into the egress put the clones in the queue between ingress
and egress pipelines. Since we currently do not model the ingress
and egress pipelines as separate threads, we only support a single
packet in the queue between the two. Therefore, we do not directly
support clone into egress. Instead, we treat such clones as new
incoming packets with auxiliary flags to skip the ingress pipeline.
3.6 Network Semantics
It is useful to be able to simulate or analyze a network of P4 pro-
grams rather than just a single program (Sections 5.3.2 and 5.2).
In order to do so, we need the semantics of the network. Thanks
to the modularity of K, we easily modeled the semantics of a P4
network without changing the P4 language semantics. We only
needed to add a few more cells and preprocessing rules. We added a
root nodes cell containing multiple node cells each containing the
configuration of a P4 program plus a nodeId cell. We also added a
topology cell which holds the connection between the nodes.
To model the network links, we added a single rule that takes
a packet from the end of the output stream of one node and puts
it at the beginning of the input stream of the node it is connected
to. If needed, one can also model packet loss in the links by a
single additional rule. Note that here we have multiple threads of
concurrent execution, whose interleaving is non-deterministic. The
thread interleaving space can be explored using the K search mode
(Section 5.2).
4 EVALUATION
K provides us with an interpreter derived automatically from the
semantics, enabling us to test our semantics. Official conformance
test suits are an ideal target for testing executable semantics. Un-
fortunately, P4 does not have such a test suite. A new official P4
compiler front end (p4c [16]) has a limited set of tests for P414,
which we used in our evaluation.
Generally, it is non-trivial to port tests across different implemen-
tations of P4, as its IO is not specified (Section 2.3). Fortunately, the
p4c tests were easy to adopt. Each test, along with the P4 program
under test, contains an STF file. The file describes table entries,
input packets, and the expected output packets. We systematically
converted the STF files into our test format.
The suite contains tests with minor issues including use of dep-
recated syntax, unspecified constructs, or unspecified primitive
actions. We fixed the issues by slightly modifying to the corre-
sponding P4 programs or test files, and implementing the primitive
actions in a target specific module for the tests. Moreover, the tests
1In all of our experiments we used only a single thread for each P4 program. Through-
out the paper we assume executions are single threaded.
assume undefined2 egress specification leads to packet drop. The
specification does not specify the behavior in this case, so it is target
dependent. In our semantics, by default the execution gets stuck in
such cases. In our target dependent module for the tests, we added
a rule to drop the packet in such cases.
The tests also helped us identify a few problems in P4K. For
example, we found that we had misunderstood the semantics of
a primitive action (pop). Note that push and pop have rather an
unusual semantics in P4 [42].
After fixing the problems with the tests and our semantics, P4K
passed 39 out of the 40 test. The failing test3 has multiple inferable
deparsing orders. The order chosen in our execution happens to
be different from the order the test expects. We verified that both
orders are possible.
Inspired by [53], we measured the percentage of the semantics
rules exercised by the tests (the semantic coverage of the tests).
The tests cover under 54% of the semantics and miss many of the
semantic features. We have also manually developed 30 tests during
our formalization process. Together, these 70 tests cover almost all
the semantic rules.
Each test took 19.5s (± 3.2s) on average with the maximum
of 125s.4 We note that approx. 10s out of this time is the startup
time of K and is not related to execution. We also note that K has
multiple backends. We use an open source backend [18] which is
relatively very poor in terms of performance.We expect the runtime
to improve by orders of magnitude on performant commercial
backends (e.g. [30]).
5 APPLICATIONS
Besides defining a formal semantics for P4 and thus helping make
the P4 specification more precise, a secondary objective of our
effort was to make use of the various tools that K provides. We
demonstrate how the tools can be useful for the P4 developers and
network administrators, as well as for the P4 language designers
and compiler developers.
5.1 Detecting Unportable Code
As seen above, in some cases the P4 specification does not provide
the expected behavior of the program. P4 programs exhibiting such
unspecified behavior may not be portable among different targets
and compilers. It is not wise to solely rely on the expertise of P4
developers in the low level details of the specification to check if
their code is portable. It is desirable to have tools that automate
this check. For simple cases, such behavior may be detectable by
syntactic checks. In general, unspecified behavior may depend on
the input.
By default, we do not provide semantics for cases which are not
covered by the language specification. If the execution of a program
reaches a point with unspecified behavior, the execution gets stuck.
Avoiding over-specification therefore allows us to check for unspec-
ified behavior in P4 programs. This is done simply by running the
program and checking whether it reaches a state in which it gets
2According to the specification egress specification is undefined unless set explicitly.
We model this using the @undef value.
3Namely parser_dc_full.stf.
4All experiments are run on a machine with Intel Xenon CPU ES-1660 3.30GHz and
32GB DDR3 1333MHz RAM.
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stuck or not. The check can be performed using either concrete or
symbolic inputs. We show a symbolic example in Section 5.3.
To tune the semantics for a specific target, one can provide
custom semantics for cases with unspecified behavior in the target
specific module.
5.2 State Space Exploration
K provides a search execution mode which allows us to explore
all possible execution traces when non-determinism is present.
In K, non-determinism occurs when more that one rewrite rule
is applicable, or the same rule is applicable at multiple positions
in the configuration. In normal execution mode, only one of the
applicable rules is (non-deterministically) selected. In the search
mode, all the applicable rules are explored. Moreover, the user can
explicitly control the points in which non-determinism is explored.
This allows one to focus on exploration of one or more specific
sources of non-determinism and ignore the rest.
There are two sources of non-determinism in P4K. The first is due
to our approach to model the most general behavior. Examples are
order of deparsing, order of update and/or verification of calculated
fields, and order of update of direct stateful elements. The second is
due to the existence of multiple threads of execution. These include
the threads of execution inside a single P4 program, as well as
the execution of multiple nodes in a P4 network. Both sources
can be explored using the search mode. We have already shown
in Section 4 how exploration of the order of deparsing can be
useful. The benefits of exhaustive analysis of thread interleavings
in concurrency analysis are well known.
5.3 Symbolic Execution
K allows the configuration to be symbolic – i.e., to contain math-
ematical variables and logical constraints over them. During exe-
cution with a symbolic configuration, K accumulates and checks
(using Z3 [21]) all the logical constraints over the execution path –
i.e the conditions under which the rules are applicable to respective
states. Under the hood, there is no difference between symbolic and
concrete execution. Symbolic execution powers some of the other K
tools such as the program verifier (Section 5.4) and the equivalence
checker (Section 5.5). It can also be useful on its own, say, to search
for bugs in P4 programs and data planes.
5.3.1 Search for Bugs. To illustrate one application, we choose a
community provided sample P4 program which defines a very basic
L3 router [4]. Using symbolic execution, we find input packets for
which the program fails to specify the egress specification, leading
to unspecified behavior.
To do so, we prepopulate the tables with entries from the unit
test provided along with the program. We then simply start the
program with a single symbolic packet (P ) from a symbolic port in
the input packet stream (the in cell). Our goal is to find an input
packet that leads the program to a state in which neither packet
is dropped, nor its egress specification is set. We run the program
in the (symbolic) search mode. The search returns multiple inputs
which can lead to undefined egress specification. Here we only
discuss one of the more interesting ones: the search result suggests
that if "P has ethernet as its first header and ethernet.etherType !=
0x0800", then the program will end up with an undefined egress.
...
parser start {return parse_ethernet ;}
parser parse_ethernet {
extract(ethernet);
return select(latest.etherType) {
0x0800 : parse_ipv4;
default: ingress;
}}
control ingress { if (valid(ipv4)) { ... } }
Figure 4: Part of a basic L3 router [4]
Figure 4 shows the relevant snippet of the program. A simple
manual inspection confirms the finding. The parser extracts the
ethernet header and checks etherType. If it is equal to 0x0800
(i.e the IPv4 ether type), the parser then proceeds to extracting the
ipv4 header (not shown). Otherwise, instead of, say, dropping the
packet, the program starts the ingress pipeline. At the beginning
of the ingress, the program checks the validity of the ipv4 header.
If valid, the pipeline applies a sequence of tables that may set the
egress specification (not shown). Otherwise the program does not
apply any tables and the egress specification remains undefined.
Thus, under the given constraints, packet is not dropped, ipv4 is
invalid, and the egress specification is undefined.
5.3.2 Data Plane Verification. There is a growing interest to-
wards data plane verification tools such as [33–35, 47, 59]. These
tools analyze the table entries in a snapshot of the data plane and
look for violation of properties of interest. The verification of these
properties usually requires answer to queries of the following form:
What kind of packets from node A will reach node B? While using
various smart ideas to achieve better performance, all these tool are
based on the same basic idea: symbolic reasoning over the space of
packet headers.
Using our semantics, we can answer such queries by inserting a
symbolic packet at, say, node A and using symbolic execution to
find the constraints on the packets that end up at node B. The tools
mentioned above use simplified hardcoded/adhoc models of packet
processors in their analysis and miss the internal details of such
devices. They need to be re-engineered to change their model of
packet processors. There is no such need in our case. Moreover,
as will be shown in the next section, these tools can verify a very
restricted class of properties. We eliminate these limitations.
5.4 Program Verification
K features a language independent program verification infrastruc-
ture based on Reachability Logic [18]. It can be instantiated with the
semantics of a programming language such as P4 to automatically
provide a sound and relatively complete program verifier for that
language. In this system, properties to be verified are given using
a set of reachability assertions, where each reachability assertion
is written as a rewrite rule. A reachability assertion asserts that
starting from any configuration matching the left hand side of the
assertion, by execution using the input semantics, one will either
eventually reach a configuration that matches the right hand side
of the assertion or never terminate.
The standard pre/post conditions and loop invariants used in
Hoare style program verification can be encoded as reachability
assertions. Intuitively, a Hoare triple {P}C{Q} becomes "C ∧ P
rewrites to . ∧Q" where “.” is the empty program [32].
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5.4.1 The Load Balancer Program. To showcase the use of the
program verifier, we provide a simple P4 program and verify a
simple property about it. The program above is meant to balance
header_type meta_t { fields { reg_val : 8; } }
metadata meta_t meta;
parser start{ return ingress; }
register reg { width: 8; instance_count: 1; }
action read_reg (){
register_read(meta.reg_val ,reg ,0); }
table read_reg_table{
reads{ meta.valid : exact; }
actions{ read_reg; } }
action balance(port ,val){
modify_field(standard_metadata.egress_spec ,port);
register_write(reg , 0, val);}
table balance_table{
reads{ meta.reg_val : exact; }
actions{ balance; } }
control ingress{ apply(read_reg_table); apply(
balance_table); }
Figure 5: A simple load balancer
its incoming packets (from any port) between two output ports.
This is done using a register whose value alternates between 0
and 1 across incoming packets. The program features a single
register, a metadata instance, and two tables. The parser starts
ingress without extracting anything. We install a single entry in
read_reg_table to call action read_reg. The action copies the reg-
ister value (at index 0) into meta.reg_val 5. We install two rules in
balance_table. One rule matches if meta.reg_val = 1 and calls
balance(1,0). The other rule matches if meta.reg_val = 0 and
calls balance(0,1). balance(p,v) modifies the register (at index
0) with value v and effectively sends the packet to port p. Our goal
is to prove that this program (along with its table entries) correctly
balances the load. Specifically, we want to prove the following:
Property: For any input stream of packets, after processing all
the packets, no packet is dropped and no new packet is added; all
the packets in the output are either sent to port 0 or port 1; and the
absolute difference between the number of packets sent to ports
0 and 1 is less than or equal to 1. Albeit simple, none of the data
plane verification tools mentioned above are capable of proving it.
They lack either support for stateful data plane elements or support
for reasoning over an unbounded (i.e symbolic) stream of packets.
In K, the property is captured by the following reachability asser-
tion. For presentation purposes we have omitted the less relevant,
mostly static parts of the specification which hold the program and
the table entries. The full specification can be found in [45].〈
@execute
@end
〉
k
〈
⟨r eд ⟩ name
〈
0 7→ 0
_
〉
vals
〉
stateful
〈
I
.
〉
in〈
.
?O
〉
out ensures
∥onPor t (?O, 0) − onPor t (?O, 1)) ∥ ≤ 1
∧onPor t (?O, 0) + onPor t (?O, 1)) = size(?O )
∧size(?O ) = size(I )
In the specification above, @excute is the program state right
before the execution starts. @end is state after all the input packets
are processed6. I is a (universal) symbolic variable representing
5This is done because register values can not directly be matched in tables.
6This state is only added due to technical reasons for verification purposes, as actual
P4 programs never terminate. We add a rule causing the program to jump to this state
once the input packet stream becomes empty.
the input packet stream and ?O is an existential symbolic variable
representing the output stream. Symbol “.” in both in and out cells
represents an empty packet stream. The rewrite in the vals cell
says that the value of the register reg (at index 0) is 0 at start7, and
its value at the end is not relevant to the assertion. The keyword
ensures adds logical constraints on the right hand side of the
assertion (i.e the post condition). Function onPort(s,p) returns
the the number of packets in stream s belonging to port p. Function
size(s) returns the length of stream s .
Our semantics of P4 contains a main loop over the stream of
input packets. Since in our property the input is a symbolic list
with an unbounded length, similar to Hoare logic, we need a loop
invariant. To prove our property, we provide the loop invariant as
the following reachability assertion:〈
@nextPacket
@end
〉
k
〈
⟨r eд ⟩ name
〈
0 7→ R
_
〉
vals
〉
stateful
〈
I
.
〉
in〈
O1
?O2
〉
out requires
(R = 1 ∧ onPor t (O1, 0) = onPor t (O1, 1)) + 1∨
R = 0 ∧ onPor t (O1, 0) = onPor t (O1, 1)))
∧onPor t (O1, 0) + onPor t (O1, 1) = size(O1)
ensures
∥onPor t (?O2, 0) − onPor t (?O2, 1)) ∥ ≤ 1
∧onPor t (?O2, 0) + onPor t (?O2, 1) = size(?O2)
∧size(I ) + size(O1) = size(?O2)
Here, @nextPacket is the head of the main loop over the input
packet stream. Keyword requires puts logical constraints on the
left hand side of the assertion (i.e the precondition). The assertion
reads as: starting from the head of the main loop, given the con-
straints in requires are satisfied, if the program terminates, it will
reach an @end state that satisfies the constraints in ensures.
We gave the two assertions to the K’s program verifier instan-
tiated with our P4 semantics. The verifier successfully proved the
loop invariant and the first reachability assertion (i.e., the desired
property). The verification took about 80s.
In this example, we used concrete table entries as the entries
are part of the functionality that we aimed to verify. In general,
depending on the property, the tables – as well as anything else –
can be symbolic. We show an example in the next section.
5.5 Translation Validation
P4 programs eventually need to be compiled into the instruction set
(i.e the language) of the target hardware for execution. With any
compilation, there is the question of whether or not the semantics
of the input program is preserved by the compiler. Currently the
compilers usually lack formal semantic preservation guarantees
since providing such guarantees requires a significant effort. The
issue is even more pronounced when sophisticated compiler op-
timizations are involved. A promising alternative approach is to
verify each instance of compilation instead of the whole compiler.
This approach, known as tranlation validation [54], aims to verify
the semantic equivalence of a program and its compiled counterpart,
potentially using hints from the compiler.
Recently, K has introduced a prototype tool (named KEQ [57]) for
cross language program equivalence checking using a generalized
notion of bisimulation. The notion enables us to mask irrelevant
intermediate states and consider only the relevant states in com-
paring two program executions. KEQ takes the K semantics of the
7We made the assumption that registers are initialized to 0.
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two programming languages, two input programs written in the
respective languages, and a set of synchronization points as input,
and checks whether or not the two programs are equivalent.
Each synchronization point is a pair of symbolic states (called
cuts) in the two input programs. The meaning of synchronization
is defined by the user as a logical constraint over the given pair
of symbolic states. It usually consists of checking the equality of
certain relevant values. Each cut in the pair is essentially a pattern
over the configurations of the semantics of the respective languages
(similar to the right or left hand side of rewrite rules). The user
labels one or more synchronization points as trusted. These points
are assumed to already be bisimilar. Usually one (and the only one)
such point is the end of the two programs and the constraint is the
equality of the respective output values.
For the rest of the synchronization points, the equivalence checker
checks whether the given points are bisimilar. It basically means
that starting from the two cuts in a synchronization point, using
the semantics of the respective languages, all reachable synchro-
nization points are respectively bisimilar. Normally one such point
is the start of the two programs. The constraint is the equality of
the respective input values. Additional synchronization points may
be needed as well, such as the beginning of unbounded loops. We
refer the interested readers to [57] for more details on KEQ.
5.5.1 P4 → IMP+ Translation Validation. We illustrate KEQ
through a small example. We check the equivalence of a simple
P4 program with a program written in another language. For this
purpose, we developed a very simple imperative language called
IMP+. The language syntactically resembles C, although semanti-
cally it is much simpler. We also developed the semantics of IMP+
in K. We provide a set of API functions for the language to send
and receive packets, read tables, etc. The name of these functions
are prefixed with the “#” symbol. For simplicity, we directly provide
semantics to such functions in our semantics. We chose the simple
P4 program in Figure 1 for translation. We manually translate it
into IMP+ as follows:8
int h1_f1; int h1_f2; bool h1_valid;
int sm_egress_spec;
bool parse(){ return start(); }
bool start(){
if (! #has_next (8)){ return false; }
h1_f1 = #extract_next (8, false);
if (! #has_next (8)){ return false;}
h1_f2 = #extract_next (8, false);
h1_valid = true;
return true;}
void a(int n){
h1_f2 = n; sm_egress_spec = 1; }
void b(){ sm_egress_spec = 2; }
void apply_t (){
//p2
while (# get_next_entry ()) {
if (# entry_matches(h1_f1)){
#call_entry_action (); return; }}
if (# has_default_action ()){
#call_default_action (); }}
bool process_packet (){
#reset();
sm_egress_spec = -1;
h1_valid = false;
8We assume packets with undefined egress specification will be dropped.
p0 p1 p2
p3
Figure 6: Abstract transition relation between p0...p3.
if (! parse()){ return false; }
if (sm_egress_spec == -1){return false;}
return true;}
void deparse (){
#emit(h1_f1); #emit(h1_f2); #add_payload (); }
void main(){ //p0
//p1
while (# get_next_packet ()){
if (! process_packet ()){ #drop(); }
else{ deparse (); #output_packet ();}}}
//p3 [trusted]
The goal is to prove the equivalence of the two programs. Our notion
of equivalence is defined as follows: for any input stream of packets,
and for any table entries in table t , at the end of processing all the
input packets, the two programs generate the same output stream
of packets. To do so, we manually provide a few synchronization
points. We have annotated the IMP+ program with the points. Next
we informally describe the points and their constraints. The full
specification can be found in [45].
p0 is the start of the two programs. The condition associated
with this points is the equality of the respective input streams, table
entries, and table default actions.
p1 is the main loop over the input packets. Its condition is same
as p0’s condition plus the equality of the respective current output
packet streams.
p2 is the loop over table entries. The condition is p1’s condition
plus the equality of the field values in the parsed representation
of the P4 program and the corresponding variables in the IMP+
program, plus the equality of the index of iteration of the tables
entries9, and the equality of the current packet payloads.
p3 is the end of execution10. The condition is the equality of the
respective output packet streams. p3 is trusted.
Figure 6 illustrates the abstract transition relation between the
points. Each arrow represents multiple rewrite steps in each pro-
gram, ignoring the irrelevant (possibly non-equivalent) intermedi-
ate states of the programs. Note how this abstraction enables us to
establish the equivalence even though the programs are written in
two quite different programming languages.
Given the synchronization points, KEQ was able to prove the
equivalence. Although the program is very simple, we believe it
captures the essence of many of the programs that are used in
practice. In addition, note that we provided the synchronization
points by hand. In practice, the compiler can automatically provide
this information as it has enough knowledge during the translation.
9Note that in our semantics of both P4 and IMP+, the table entries are sorted in the
descending order of their priority.
10For technical reasons we assume both programs terminate once the input packet
stream becomes empty.
10
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Semantics of Programming Languages in K
The K framework has been used to provide complete executable
semantics for several programming languages. Here we briefly
overview the more relevant work.
KCC [23] formalizes the semantics of C11, passing 99.2% of GCC
torture test suit, more than what the GCC and Clang could pass.
Later work [31] develops the "negative" semantics of C11 and is
able to identify programs with undefined behavior. In our work,
we identify unspecified behavior by lack of semantics.
K-Java [8] formalizes Java 1.4 and follows a test-driven methodol-
ogy to manually provide a suite of 800+ tests.
KJS [53] provides semantics for JavaScript passing all 2700+ tests
in a conformance test suite [22]. The authors introduce the notion
of semantic coverage for test suites which has inspired our work.
In these works, the language design predates the formalization
effort by several years. Consequently, althoughmore complex, these
languages are quite stable. P4 is still at the early stages of the
language design process and is relatively unstable. This made the
formalization effort challenging.
Recently, KEVM [32] formalizes the EtheriumVirtualMachine [58],
successfully passing a suite of 40K official tests. Like P4K, KEVM
targets a new language and reveals problems in its specification.
These works (except K-Java) rely heavily on existing tests to
provide semantics. In our case, such a comprehensive test suite still
does not exist. The only test suite that we found covers less than
54% of our semantics.
6.2 Network Verification
Bugs happen frequently in networks and lead to performance prob-
lems, service disruptions, security vulnerabilities, etc. Scale and
complexity of networks make answering even the simplest func-
tional correctness queries prohibitively hard to answer manually.
This has ignited research into automating the process of network
verification which can be broadly categorized as follows:
Data plane verification reactively checks network wide proper-
ties in a data plane by analyzing snapshots of it. We have already
discussed the work in this area in Section 5. None of these tools
readily supports P4. An exception is [50] which will be discussed
in the next section.
Control plane verification proactively ensures a network is free
of latent bugs by analyzing its control plane logic. The literature
targets both traditional and SDN control planes. The techniques
include static analysis (e.g. [26]), simulation and emulation (e.g. [28,
49]), model checking (e.g. [55]), SMT solving (e.g. [6]), testing
(e.g. [10, 24]), control plane abstractions (e.g. [25, 29]), and deduc-
tive verification (e.g. [3]). All of these works (except [49]) assume a
fixed and simple model for the data plane elements which misses
the internal details of the devices.
Although control plane is out of the scope of this work, it it
worth mentioning that SDN controllers are usually written using
mainstream programming languages 11 for which K semantics exist
(e.g. ONOS [7] is in Java and P4Runtime [17] is in C). By combining
11Though there is a recent progress towards high level programming languages for
controllers [1, 2, 5].
the K semantics of controller programs with our semantics of P4
data planes, we can analyze a complete model of the whole network.
We leave this as future work.
6.3 Semantics and Analysis of P4
We are not aware of any extensive efforts to formalize the P4 lan-
guage. P4NOD [50] (on paper) provides a big step operational se-
mantics of a subset of the P4 language. The authors use the seman-
tics to provide a translator from P4 to Datalog. The result is used
in P4 data plane verification using a Datalog engine optimized for
this purpose [51]. The authors also use the tool to catch a class of
bugs, called well-formedness bugs, that are unique to P4 networks.
Finally, the authors show an example of P4 to P4 equivalence check.
The primary focus of our work is the language itself and its
problems. We provide a modular small step operational semantics
for all features of P4. Using K tools, among other things, we too are
able to perform data plane verification and detect well-formedness
bugs. We have also shown an example of translation validation
between P4 and other languages defined in K. In P4NOD the trust
base consists of the semantics, the Datalog engine, and the P4 to
Datalog translator. In P4K, it consists of the semantics and the K
framework. We leave a quantitative comparison of the two works
as a future work.
7 CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, FUTURE
WORK
Wehave presented P4K, the first complete semantics of P414. Through
our formalization process, we have identified many problems with
the language specification. We automatically provide a suite of
analysis tools derived directly from our semantics. We have dis-
cussed and demonstrated the applications of some of the tools for
P4 developers and designers.
With the introduction of P416, P414 may sooner or later be dep-
recated, especially because P416 addresses many of P414’s issues
through backwards-incompatible changes. Nevertheless, we think
that formalizing P414 was a worthwhile effort. There are still im-
portant applications written in P414 (e.g. [13]) that do not have a
P416 equivalent. The language consortium provides a translator
from P414 to P416. However, without a clear semantics of P414, the
translation itself might be problematic. We are aware of at least one
instance [27] in which the translator’s P416 output is not equivalent
to its P414 input.
We plan to formalize P416 in near future. We believe transition
to P416 will be straight forward. P416 has actually a smaller core
language compared to P414.
Beside other future directions discussed throughout the paper,
we also plan to use our semantics to analyze real world P4 programs
(specially [13, 19]) and networks.
Another interesting use case of our semantics which we leave as
a future work is to automatically generate a test suite that covers
all of our semantic rules. Such a test suite can be very useful for
P4 compiler developers, because they can regenerate the tests each
time the language changes.
We conclude by a lesson we learned. It is relatively easy and
extremely beneficial to rapidly apply formal methods at the early
stages of a language design process. Not only it helps the designers
11
quickly identify problems in their design and produce more robust
languages, but also (in case a framework like K is employed) it can
save time and effort by automatically providing various useful tools
for the language.
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